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The spirit of this article is to offer a fresh perspective 
related to the future of aid as a way of informing the ongoing 
discourse on development assistance to the benefit of policy 
makers and key stakeholders.  It suggests that aid deployment 
ought to change in such a way as to improve governance and has 
shown where and how. We explore governance’s focus as well as 
the World Bank dimensions.  Under focus, we concentrate on the 
transparency of government, the simplicity of procedures, 
accountability and responsibility, the need to fight against 
corruption, individual freedom and collective expression, and 
independence of the legal system. For the World Bank dimensions, 
the concentration is on: voice and accountability, political stability 
and the absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. With respect to 
regulation and corruption, we address whether to use market-based 
or regulatory measures, possible policy instruments, 
implementation issues, and difficulties and problems. Under 
possible policy instruments, mandatory policy instruments, 
voluntary agreements, compliance instruments, and precautionary 
measures are explored. Implementation issues include introductory 
matters, costs, free riding and voluntary agreement and 
compliance. In addition, we examine difficulties associated with 
distributional issues, compensation, regulatory capture 
phenomenon, and the effect on innovation. Regarding corruption, 
we examine its definition, state capture versus conventional 
corruption, corrupt acts, forms of corruption, hypothetical causes 
of corruption, some analytical points, theoretical consequences, 
unbinding bribery, incidence of corruption, fraud, and control 
measures. 
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As governments and institutions continue to provide 
development financing, aid deployment should change in such a 
way as to improve governance. Good governance has proven 
central to economic development that is specific to a given country 
or set of countries. Fresh thinking related to the future of aid 
informs the ongoing discourse on development assistance and 
should therefore be availed to policy makers and key stakeholders.  
Such is the spirit of this article as it focuses on governance, 
particularly in relation to regulation and corruption. 
 
Governance 
According to Jha and Zhuang (2014), the concept of 
governance is broad – but nearly always includes voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control of corruption. Good governance has political, economic, 
and institutional dimensions; Kaufmann (2005: 41) defines it as the 
following: “traditions and institutions by which authority in a 
country is exercised for the common good. This includes the 
process by which those in authority are selected, monitored, and 
replaced (the political dimension); the government’s capacity to 
effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies (the 
economic dimension); and the respect of citizens and the state for 
the country’s institutions (the institutional respect dimension)”. 
The World Bank offers a narrower definition, describing 
good governance to be “epitomized by predictable, open, and 
enlightened policy making (that is, transparent processes); a 
bureaucracy imbued with professional ethos; an executive arm of 
government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society 
participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of 
law” (Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2008: 7). Jha and Zhuang (2014) 
states that good governance requires transparency, accountability, 
rule of law, and effective and legitimate institutions. 
Much emphasis has been recently placed on good 
governance as a key to development effectiveness and it has been 
argued, for example, that merely spending money on public goods 
and services may not lead to desirable outcomes if the country 
does not have the right governance environment. Indeed, 
economists have known for some time that there is a highly 
significant correlation between governance and economic growth 
over the long run, but the precise nature of this relationship is 
difficult to pin down because growth is a function of many 
variables. That said, the World Bank clearly states, “the direction 
     Mubazi: Aid Effectiveness and Good Governance Consilience 
of causality is clear: it goes from better governance to higher 
income and not vice versa”. 
Governance focuses on the following1: 
1. Transparency of government: Citizens must be kept 
informed of the decisions of the state and their justification. 
2. Simplicity of procedures: Whether in fiscal matters, 
investment, or other areas, administrative procedures need to be as 
simple as possible, with the number of participants reduced to a 
minimum. 
3. Accountability/Responsibility: Public officials must 
be held accountable and, if necessary, penalized for offences. 
4. Fight against corruption: Eradicating this scourge is 
imperative for promoting health competition, eliminating 
surcharges, and strengthening the efficiency of economic 
management. 
5. Individual freedom and collective expression: A 
free and responsible press, in particular, is an important pillar of 
democracy. 
6. Independence of the legal system: To be free from 
pressure and intervention from political forces or other 
organizations to ensure that its decisions are independent and 
impartial. 
 
The World Bank’s database on governance is based on the 
following six dimensions2 which are also covered more briefly 
than below by Kaufmann (2005: 41-43): 
1. Voice and accountability includes indicators that 
measure various aspects of the political process, including civil 
liberties, political and human rights, and the extent to which 
citizens of a country are able to select their governments. 
2. Political stability and absence of violence combines 
several indicators that measure perceptions of the likelihood that 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconventional 
means, including through domestic violence and terrorism. 
3. Government effectiveness combines responses on 
the quality of public service, the independence of the civil service 
from political pressure, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to various policies. 
                                                
1 Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) used two indicators of governance in a country, the level of corruption and the 
quality of bureaucracy, to examine the link between specific budgetary allocations and outcomes and to see how 
these relationships are affected by improved governance. 
 
2 For more information about the World Bank’s work on governance, visit 
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/index.html. The governance indicators are available at 
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata. 
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4. Regulatory quality focuses on policies that hamper 
the functioning of an efficient market, such as price controls or 
inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens 
imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and 
business development. 
5. Rule of Law includes several indicators that 
measure the extent to which citizens have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence 
of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and 
the ability to enforce contracts. 
6. Control of corruption is a measure of corruption, 
conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private 
gain or, according to Kaufmann (2005: 41) “abuse of public office 
for private gain”.3 It is based on scores of variables from polls of 
experts and surveys. 
 
Regulation 
We start by addressing whether to use market-based or 
regulatory measures. Regulatory policies are generally government 
imposed restrictions or controls, while market-based policies 
encourage economic principles of supply and demand to determine 
the course of action. There are several reasons why politicians 
traditionally take a regulatory approach rather than an economic 
incentive-based approach. Industry tends to favor direct regulation 
over incentive mechanisms because if a tax instrument is used, the 
offender must pay fees in addition to controlling costs, although 
the acceptance of this approach will be influenced by any revenue 
recycling while firms may have greater influence over the specifics 
of uniform standards. The effects of quantity regulation are 
perceived to be more certain while economic efficiency arguments 
often rely on a relatively sophisticated understanding of market 
operation and price effects which are indirect compared with 
regulation. 
In the final analysis, governments are likely to choose a 
mixture of regulatory and market-based approaches. In economies 
without well-developed market systems, there may be net 
efficiency gains from applying regulatory approaches. On the other 
hand, the adoption of a market-based approach may speed the 
development of the market system. Net efficiency gains may favor 
the development of market-based systems at an earlier date than 
otherwise would be the case. 
After looking at the reasons why regulatory or market 
based policies might be preferred, we now look at the various 
possible policy instruments in this area: 
                                                
3 The broader definition and other aspects are given in the second last section of this article. 
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• Mandatory policy instruments may include imposing 
quantity limits on the use of particular inputs or outputs.  
For instance, a company may be required to use so 
much power or water per day in its production and/or 
consumption activities. Technology standards can be 
imposed like a producer being asked to use only a 
particular or a better technology in the production 
processes. 
 
• Beyond mandatory policy instruments, voluntary 
agreements can also play an important role.  The threat 
of mandatory government intervention may be enough 
to encourage voluntary agreements. Forward-looking 
firms may undertake some control steps if they fear 
costlier mandatory controls in the absence of voluntary 
actions. 
 
• Compliance instruments may include deposit 
requirements and/or tax obligations. Deposit refund 
systems can be compared to tax/subsidy schemes where 
the deposit acts like a tax, while the refund acts like a 
subsidy. One of the advantages of deposit refund 
systems is that ordinary taxes are not required for 
financing the refund/subsidy incentive. 
 
• As precautionary measures, policy instruments should 
be designed to provide needed information. Ways in 
which this can be done include government taking 
actions that directly reduce regulatory uncertainty. At a 
minimum government or regulatory authorities can 
avoid creating regulatory barriers that drive up 
transaction costs and discourage trading. 
 
Implementation Issues 
We have looked at some policy instruments that can be 
used under regulation in order to make aid effective. Below we 
look at some implementation issues that come into play so as to 
make regulation effective in directing and assisting aid efforts by 
aid agencies. 
In assessing any of the wide range of instruments as 
potential devices, it is imperative to give due consideration to the 
implementation issues that can severely affect real-world 
outcomes. Such issues need to be considered in the design, whether 
at the national, multilateral, or global level (Sacasa, 2008). 
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In terms of costs, a number of factors can adversely affect 
the performance of actual regulatory programs or policies. These 
include: administrative and transaction costs; nonprofit-
maximizing behavior such as sales or staff maximization; the pre-
existing regulatory environment; and the degree of monitoring and 
enforcement. 
Transaction costs, among others, are potentially important 
in the performance of a regulation. Potential sources of transaction 
costs include search and information, bargaining and decision, and 
monitoring and enforcement. The magnitude of these transaction 
costs will depend on the structure of the market and the extent to 
which individual transactions require regulatory approval.  
Implementation costs may be least where incentives to comply are 
self-enforcing. Monitoring, for instance, could rely partly on self-
reporting, supplemented by access to inventories. An effective 
enforcement system makes ultimate sanctions credible, so that 
penalties would rarely need to be imposed. Monitoring and 
enforcement can be significant but these costs are typically borne 
by the respective government authority. 
Although technology-based standards may seem to be the 
least cost-effective of the policy instruments, if monitoring costs 
are high in some particular circumstances they may have an 
advantage because they are relatively easy to monitor and enforce.  
An inspector can simply check whether a particular piece of 
equipment has been installed, rather than continuously monitor 
information. 
The direct cost of regulation is the reduction in profits and 
consumer welfare due to regulatory constraint on choice. The 
distribution of this cost is often hidden, but that does not make it 
unimportant (Fisher et al. 1996: 415). 
As long as participation is voluntary, participants will have 
incentives to free ride, sharing the benefits without sharing the 
costs.  This is a distortion. Free-rider deterrence is concerned with 
securing broad participation in an agreement. A stable coalition of 
co-operators may exist in spite of free-rider incentives. The size of 
this coalition will depend on the ability of the co-operators to 
punish that might withdraw from the coalition and reward that who 
might accede. However, to be effective, such punishments and 
rewards must be substantial and credible, but these requirements 
often clash. As a result, the size of the stable coalition may be quite 
small. 
There is also a compliance concern, or the incentive that 
participants have to fulfill their pledges under an agreement. Some 
agreements contain explicit compliance measures. However, it is 
more usual for agreements to seek alternative means for securing 
compliance. 
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Sheng (2009) is of the view that regulatory circles must 
include constant reviews of outcomes against objectives. These 
reviews must examine how the strategy, priorities, incentives, 
standards, structures, processes, and execution have been done; 
and whether in the right dimensions and contexts. Further, 
regulators should focus on making and implementing rules, not 
making market choices. However, they should improve the trading 
system, monitor special interest groups, ensure adequate 
information disclosure, penalize offenders, and educate investors. 
 
Difficulties and Challenges 
Adoption of any instruments will have some impact on the 
distribution of wealth between and within countries.  Negotiations 
about distributional issues are likely to be crucial in determining 
the final policy mix that is chosen. For instance, some of the 
government revenues from taxes may be returned to the affected 
parties. Although the precise nature of the distribution will be the 
subject of vigorous political discussions, participants are unlikely 
to accept an agreement that substantially shifts the distribution of 
wealth or political power. 
All instruments probably will have to, and also can, be 
connected with compensatory measures. Where the costs of 
regulation are regressive, compensatory transfers may be used, 
funded from a specific tax or general government finances, or the 
regulation might be modified, exempting some individuals or firms 
from the regulatory net. 
Regulatory capture phenomenon is a difficulty with a 
regulatory approach where the regulatory agency may, over time, 
develop such a close working relationship with the regulated 
industry, for example, that it relaxes its enforcement standards in 
the interest of the industry itself (Fisher et al. 1996: 413). The state 
regulatory agency created to act in the public interest instead acts 
in favor of the commercial or special interests that dominate in the 
industry or sector it is charged with regulating. 
Another regulatory problem is that once a performance 
standard has been satisfied, there is little benefit to the individual 
firm from developing and/or adopting even cleaner or better 
technology. In addition, regulated firms may fear that if they do 
develop a cleaner or better technology, the performance standard 
will be tightened.  In this way innovation is affected negatively. 
Technology standards are even worse than performance 
standards in inhibiting innovation, since, by their nature, they 
constrain the technological choices available, and may therefore 
remove all incentives to develop new technologies. In this way 
regulation may inhibit innovation or remove incentives to develop 
new technologies. It is therefore very important while considering 
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regulation to consider its likely effect on innovation. Aid agencies 
would therefore try to strike an optimal balance so as not to 
prevent innovation while at the same time they are effective with 
their regulation. Specific policy suggestions would include setting 
standards, instituting bans, unifying technology and performance, 
and using incentives. 
Since technology-based (or design) standards typically 
require the use of specified equipment, processes, or procedures, 
aid agencies would spell them out. Uniform standards can also take 
the form of outright bans of certain products or processes.  Aid 
agencies could set up uniform technology and performance-based 
standards which may be effective in achieving particular goals and 
standards. Use of conventional technology can also be encouraged. 
As with virtually all policy instruments, the administration of 
uniform standards typically includes programs for compliance 
monitoring and enforcement. 
All forms of intervention have the potential for inducing or 
forcing some amount of technological change because, by their 
nature, they induce or require firms to do things they would not 
otherwise do. The specific combination of methods that might best 
achieve the goals and the value of the used methods to the various 
nations would depend on the intervention approaches used. In the 
literature there are the general equilibrium, the policy (socialism 
and development), and the social market economy. 
The general equilibrium approach is based on the 
assumption of independent decision making of economic units 
(households and firms) interacting in such a way as to maximize 
efficiency and social welfare in terms of the pareto optimality 
conditions and the Abba Lerner welfare conditions.  For the policy 
approach we start with the social objective function (SOF) 
specifying goals and priorities. It is a macroeconomic function 
exogenously given by the state in a socialist setting but under 
perfect competition we assume it is there and originates from each 
household. Under the socialist approach, the SOF defines equality 
of opportunities as an ultimate social objective derived from 
collective ownership and central planning of the means of 
production. In this case state intervention abolishes the market 
mechanism. The development approach contains a development 
function, like fair distribution of opportunities and social-economic 
transformation of resources. Here intervention requires achieving 
these goals within a market mechanism environment. It may imply 
dealing with both the limitations and improvements of the 
efficiency of the market mechanism but the criterion for 
intervention is the SOF. The value system under the social market 
economy approach or model is based on market efficiency that 
rests on equal opportunity. 




Corruption can be broadly defined as the use and/or abuse 
of public office or exercise of public power for personal private 
unlawful gain.  It is the misuse of office for unofficial ends. Within 
this broad definition of corruption, we now distinguish between 
state capture/influence peddling and the conventional or traditional 
corruption. According to Shah and Schacter (2004: 41), state 
capture/influence peddling is a collusion by private actors with 
public officials or politicians for their mutual, private benefit.  The 
private sector “captures” the state legislative, executive, and 
judicial apparatus for its own purposes. State capture coexists with 
the conventional (and opposite) view of corruption in which public 
officials extort or otherwise exploit the private sector for private 
ends. 
State capture, according to Anderson (2005), is the undue 
and illicit influence of the elite in shaping the laws, policies, and 
regulations of the state. It differs from the conventional corruption, 
the use of bribery to influence the implementation of laws and 
regulations. State capture has potentially wider impact and can 
severely hinder a country’s ability to benefit from economic 
growth if the fruits of income growth largely accrue to an elite that 
benefits from improper governance. 
We need to look specifically at corrupt acts before we delve 
further in the subject of corruption. Corrupt acts include bribery 
and extortion which involve two parties who often both benefit.  
Fraud and embezzlement are carried out alone. As seen above, 
state capture and/or influence peddling are/is also a corrupt act so 
is nepotism. 
“Speed money”, money paid to government officials to 
speed up their consideration of a business matter falling within 
their jurisdiction is a corrupt act. Practices of insider lending and 
use of inside information and/or knowledge for private gain are 
also corrupt acts. Appropriation of public assets for private use, 
appropriation of rents and excessive profits, and misuse of aid and 
public funds are also corrupt acts. 
Corruption can be of different forms like high-level or 
grand, for example kickbacks to Ministers. It can be low-level, like 
petty bribes to juniors. It can also be well-organized and well-
known or chaotic, surrounded with uncertainty. High-level and 
low-level tend to coexist and reinforce each other. The chaotic 
form has worse effects (more deleterious) than the well-organized 
and well-known. This is because it creates a lot of uncertainties, 
among other things. 
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Theory is also useful in explaining corruption. We 
therefore turn to some very simple hypothetical causes of 
corruption. Namely, corruption is most likely where government 
regulation gives public officials discretional powers. Indeed, Rajan 
(2005: 56-57) argues that “…discretion is problematic in the hands 
of the corrupt.” Hypothetically, corruption is likely where there are 
institutional inefficiencies, though it can be argued that corruption 
can bring about institutional inefficiencies. The causal relationship 
is not obvious but can be established empirically.4 Other 
hypothetical causes are the restrictions and government 
intervention that lead to the presence of excessive profits. Also, 
when very low wages are paid to workers/employees corruption 
may result. However, it can be argued that reasonable wages are 
necessary but not sufficient to avoid corruption. 
Analytically we can state that: 
C = M + D – A where C = Corruption; M = Monopoly; 
D = Discretion; A = Accountability (transparency). 
C = f(Bribe size, Chances of being caught, Penalties when caught – giver and taker). 
   (+)   (-)   (-) 
Combating corruption would work on the above variables 
given political will. Basu, et al. (2013) argue that the way to root 
out corruption in society is to ensure that corrupt behavior is not 
worthwhile for amoral individuals by, for instance, enacting 
policies of punishment that make it not worthwhile for officers to 
accept bribes. 
Some negative consequences that may arise from the 
hypothetical causes discussed above include the reduction of 
economic growth as a result of lower incentives to investment 
thereby reducing private investment. This reduction of growth may 
push firms underground and acts as a regressive tax in addition to 
contributing to the misallocation of talents to rent-seeking 
activities. Corruption also reduces growth through the public 
investment channel by lowering the quality of public investment 
thereby distorting the composition of public expenditure. Thus, 
government ability to raise revenue is undercut, raise tax rates to 
the few that are taxed, undermines state’s legitimacy, and increases 
income inequality and poverty. 
Nevertheless, corruption has some positive contributions 
sometimes referred to as counterarguments. It can be argued that 
corrupt officials work harder because they are often in their offices 
in order to exploit corruption opportunities. Another counter 
argument is the grease argument: corruption helps entrepreneurs 
get around bureaucratic impediments, burdensome regulations, and 
                                                
4 A granger causality test to test for the causal direction and all that surrounds the exercise would do this. 
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ineffective legal systems. However, the direction of this causal 
relationship is ambiguous as it may be subject to reverse causality 
whereby corruption itself helps establish these bureaucratic 
impediments. Related to the grease argument is the notion of 
unbinding bribery, through which private parties can “purchase” 
certain benefits from a politician or bureaucrat. These include 
government benefits like allocations, both monetary and in kind; 
government contracts like allocations; public revenues like 
reducing it; time savings and regulatory avoidance; influencing 
outcomes of legal and regulatory processes like illegal activities 
and/or outcomes; and monopoly rights to markets like energy. 
 
Fraud 
Returning to an examination of fraud, it can be defined as 
the intentional false representation or concealment of a material 
fact for the purpose of inducing another to act upon it to his or her 
injury, or it is dishonesty in the form of intentional deception or a 
willful misrepresentation of material facts in order to induce 
another to part with something of value or surrender a legal right. 
Terms used in reference other than those already mentioned are: 
conflict of interest, fraudulent financial/non-financial statements, 
kickbacks, lapping especially in the banking sector when money 
has been banked but can still be used fraudulently, larceny, and 
skimming. 
Red flags or signs of danger that fraud might be taking 
place include the gift taker; odd couple, - two people in a company 
that is difficult to rationalize; excuse maker; rule breaker; the gift 
bearer; the too successful bidder; poor quality high prices; and the 
one-person operation, also known as briefcase business person. 
Some popular schemes in fraud include money laundering 
counterfeit currency, intellectual property, cyber cash, black 
dollars, document forgery, cheques, and credit cards. 
Negative effects of fraud on business other than those 
covered under the theoretical consequences of corruption earlier 
include staff anxiety, compromising confidentiality, bad press, 
seminar cost to combat the practice, and increased costs of its 
investigation. 
Measures of fraud control include whistle-blower 
protection, filing, promoting transparency in the operations, using 
committee systems, duties being segregated, registering assets, 
clarity about debtors and creditors, and streamlining cheques and 
cash use. 
Complementary to the fraud control measures above, 
corruption control measures, in general, would involve the use of 
international organizations and donor groups, such as the IMF 
Code of Good Practice on Fiscal Transparency. The Code is based 
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on four principles: clarity of role and responsibilities, public 
availability of information, open budget processes, and assurances 
of integrity. Other guidance could come from the World Bank 
Country Assistance Strategy and the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper approach that give priority to cross-cutting governance 
issues. In addition, high-level/profile government watchdogs can 
be used. The government can establish such to keep an eye on 
corruption activities and report to it when anything is detected so 
that action can be taken. In Uganda, for instance, are the Auditor 
General, Public Accounts Committee, and Inspector General of 
Government (Mubazi, 2012). 
The influence of the civil society or non-government 
organizations is critical to controlling corruption.  Transparency 
International that compiles the corruption index is one of the 
examples of civil societies that help to expose levels of corruption.  
The media plays a large role in exposing corruption, as can be seen 
in the Prime Minister’s office in Uganda resulting in top 
accountants being prosecuted. While the media promotes 
accountability through the disincentive of negative publicity, 
transparency of government activities and costs is crucial to 
restricting corruption in its initial instance. Examples include 
“expenditure tracking surveys” that publish data on government 
expenditures in delivering services such as education in Uganda 
and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which aims 
to publish revenues accrued from oil, gas, and mining sectors in 
many LDCs. 
“Freedom of Information” laws have been passed by a 
number of countries in order to help fight or control corruption 
and, indeed, have done a commendable job. Economic policy 
reforms have also been used. They include trade and financial 
liberalization that can reduce opportunities for corruption by 
limiting the situations where officials might exercise 
unaccountable discretionary powers, introducing transparency and 
limiting public sector monopoly power. 
Another potentially effective countermeasure against 
corruption is decentralization as it increases the accountability of 
public authorities to citizens. However, this can create new public 
authorities, each having powers to tax, spend, and regulate that are 
liable to abuse. Hence it may multiply, rather than limit, 
opportunities for corruption, and this problem has been observed in 
many developing countries that have implemented this reform. 
Raising salaries and reducing wage compression - the ratio 
between the highest and lowest pay -, can help. However, with 
weak governance wage-based strategies are not likely to succeed.  
In fact, reducing wage compression may even encourage 
corruption if positions are viewed as a lucrative career option.  
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Raising wages would simply raise the purchase price and 
subsequent corruption efforts to repay loans. 
In controlling corruption, institutional arrangements and 
enforcements are important.  Basu, et al. (2013) argues that 
corruption may be significantly less pervasive in the developed 
world than in the developing world because institutional 
arrangements and enforcement make it less possible or less 
attractive. In these countries, traditional state activities are 
relatively efficient, civil societies are relatively effective, and the 
private sector work well. 
Some societies may establish self-enforcement norms 
whereby bad behavior, like corruption, is collectively punished by 
all and people punish bad behavior because not to punish bad 
behavior is itself bad behavior. It has been argued in some 




By way of conclusion, the article has addressed the ways 
aid deployment ought to improve governance since good 
governance is central to economic development based on an 
understanding of a given country or countries. The article has 
highlighted the areas where and how aid should change such that it 
improves governance. An intuitive principle is that good 
governance accompanies development and empirical evidence 
shows that, on the whole, better governance is positively correlated 
with higher growth and better development outcomes. Indeed, Jha 
and Zhuang (2014), among others, take governance as one of the 
biggest hurdles of growth and development but argue that its 
reform priorities need to take into account cultural and institutional 
realities, by focusing on areas that address the biggest hurdles to a 
country’s growth and development. 
The nitty-gritty of governance and its major constituent 
parts (regulation and corruption in this article) have been analyzed 
or explored and in some cases very briefly discussed. The rationale 
has been to show exactly where work, through aid, ought to focus 
and how. After all, according to Martins (2014) “all successful 
developing countries have undergone a fundamental and potent 
process of structural change”. With such in place, development 
assistance availed to policy makers and key stake-holders would 
produce better fruits or results for all of us to enjoy. 
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